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INTRODUCTION 
n September 2014, the Fédération Internationale de Football 
(FIFA)—the worldwide governing body of soccer—declared its 
intent to ban the contentious practice of third-party ownership 
(TPO).1 A TPO agreement is between a soccer club and a third 
party—an investment fund, corporation, sports agent, or private 
investor—by which the third party purchases an economic stake in 
future profits from the sale of one or more players at the club.2 The 
third party believes the player has the potential to improve and be sold 
to another club for a high enough fee to make a profit on the initial 
 
1 Owen Gibson, Sepp Blatter Says Fifa Will Ban Third-Party Ownership, THE 
GUARDIAN (Sept. 26, 2014, 9:44 EDT), http://www.theguardian.com/football/2014/sep/26 
/sepp-blatter-fifa-ban-third-party-ownership. 
2 KPMG ASESORES, S.L., PROJECT TPO 11 (2013) [hereinafter KPMG]. 
I
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investment.3 The profits made selling economic stakes in future 
transfers are a crucial resource for cash-strapped soccer clubs around 
the world.4 
Early in 2014, FIFA announced that it would ban TPO, and that the 
ban would be phased in over three to four years.5 Accordingly, in 
December 2014, FIFA introduced Article 18ter of its Regulations on 
the Status and Transfer of Players (RSTP), prohibiting TPO.6 Article 
18ter allowed for the natural culmination of current TPO agreements 
and for new agreements to be signed between January 1 and April 30, 
2015, that lasted no more than one year.7 As of May 1, 2015, no new 
TPO agreements may be made.8 Notably, this timetable completely 
removed any meaningful phasing in period. 
TPO is an incredibly contentious topic in the international soccer 
community, and FIFA’s announcement has not been universally 
embraced.9 The Union of European Football Associations (UEFA)—
the European governing body of soccer—has favored eliminating 
TPO.10 Earlier in 2014, UEFA declared its intent to ban the practice 
from Europe if FIFA was unwilling to do so.11 Thus, South American 
clubs and officials believe FIFA was pressured into banning TPO by 
rich European leagues and clubs wishing to maintain their monopoly 
of the global soccer market by outlawing what many see as a 
legitimate and necessary financial asset for smaller clubs looking to 
challenge European dominance.12 
 
3 Ariel Reck & Daniel Geey, Financial Fair Play: An English Handicap?, DANIEL 
GEEY: THE FINAL SCORE ON FOOTBALL LAW (Dec. 24, 2011), http://www.danielgeey 
.com/financial-fair-play-an-english-handicap/. 
4 See id. 
5 Gibson, supra note 1. 
6 Circular No. 1464, Letter from Jérôme Valcke, Sec’y Gen., FIFA, to the Members of 
FIFA (Dec. 22, 2014) [hereinafter Circular No. 1464] (http://www.fifa.com/mm/document 
/affederation/administration/02/49/57/42/tpocircular1464_en_neutral.pdf). 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 See Brazilian Clubs Fight Back in Third-party Ownership Debate, SOCCEREX (Apr. 
26, 2013), https://www.soccerex.com/news/2013/04/brazilian-clubs-fight-back-third-party 
-ownership-debate; Liviu Bird, FIFA’s Third-party Ownership Crusade Has Major 
Implications in S. America, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 29, 2014), http://www.si.com 
/soccer/planet-futbol/2014/10/29/third-party-ownership-fifa-brazil-south-america. 
10 Owen Gibson & David Conn, Uefa Plans Rule Change to Clamp Down on Third-
party Ownership, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 23, 2014, 7:01 EDT), http://www.theguardian 
.com/football/2014/sep/23/uefa-third-party-ownership-champions-league. 
11 Id. 
12 Brazilian Clubs Fight Back in Third-party Ownership Debate, supra note 9. 
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TPO agreements are commonplace in South America, where, 
without the lucrative broadcasting and sponsorship revenue enjoyed 
by their European counterparts, clubs often have no other options.13 
That said, the practice is not limited to South America—smaller 
European clubs also depend on TPO investment for their financial and 
competitive livelihood.14 Many in favor of TPO agree that it can be 
dangerous and should be better regulated, but because of its financial 
utility, they argue a ban is disproportionately restrictive.15 Indeed, 
there is an argument that by restricting investment into clubs, FIFA’s 
ban violates European Union (EU) competition law, deflating wages, 
raising barriers to entry, and entrenching the dominant players of the 
international soccer market.16 Instead of banning TPO altogether, 
some have suggested regulations to limit the scope of agreements.17 
Such regulations would help prevent clubs from becoming overreliant 
on the practice. Not to mention, monitoring and preventing third 
parties from exercising undue influence over the clubs would achieve 
the same objectives FIFA uses to justify banning TPO while 
maintaining this useful financial practice. 
Because of the current reliance on TPO, FIFA’s ban will have 
disastrous financial and competitive consequences on the 
international soccer community, crippling clubs and entire leagues. 
Clubs have used TPO in an attempt to level the disparate playing field 
of international soccer.18 Now, without TPO, clubs across the globe 
face the challenge of surviving without a vital asset. International 
soccer is a lucrative market, where there is enough money to go 
around; but the sport lacks mechanisms for distributing that wealth, 
and those that exist are poorly enforced.19 If, instead of creating a 
 
13 See infra Part II.B. 
14 See KPMG, supra note 2, at 23; Fernando Duarte, Fifa’s Third-party Ownership 
Ban: Is It Good or Bad for Brazil?, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 21, 2014, 06:36 EDT), 
http://www.theguardian.com/football/2014/oct/21/neymar-barcelona-fifa-third-party-own 
ership-brazil. 
15 Ariel Reck, Third Party Player Ownership: Current Trends in South America and 
Europe, SPORTS L. BULL., June–Oct. 2012, at 50, 54. 
16 John Sinnott, Third-party Owner Rule Not ‘Legitimate’–Bosman Lawyer, BBC 
SPORT (Oct. 27, 2011, 9:33 GMT), http://www.bbc.com/sport/0/football/15386863. 
17 Luís Villas-Boas Pires, Third Party Ownership–To Ban or Not to Ban?, 
LAWINSPORT (Dec. 10, 2013), http://www.lawinsport.com/articles/regulation-a-gover 
nance/item/third-party-ownership-to-ban-or-not-to-ban. 
18 Alex Duff & Tariq Panja, Football Investors Get 62% in Run Around Players on 
Transfer Bet, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 5, 2013, 4:00 PM PST), http://www.bloomberg.com 
/news/articles/2013-03-06/football-investors-get-62-betting-on-player-transfers. 
19 See infra Part III.C. 
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regulatory framework to improve and structure the practice, FIFA’s 
TPO ban stands without drastic, systemic changes in international 
soccer, then FIFA’s ban could have disastrous consequences on clubs, 
players, and leagues around the world. This Article will introduce the 
practice of TPO and its role in international soccer today, before 
examining the repercussions and reactions to FIFA’s ban. Part I 
outlines how TPO agreements function and FIFA’s newly announced 
ban. Part II contextualizes TPO in the economic climate of 
international soccer, introducing the financial and competitive 
necessity of TPO, as well as arguments for why the practice should be 
prohibited. Finally, Part III discusses the repercussions of and 
reactions to banning TPO. In particular, Part III discusses the legality 
of banning TPO, whether a less-restrictive alternative to FIFA’s ban 
exists, and how the financial utility of TPO can be replaced if the ban 
stands. 
I 
THE BASICS AND MECHANICS OF THIRD-PARTY OWNERSHIP 
AGREEMENTS 
Before discussing TPO agreements, it is helpful to have a basic 
understanding of how players move between soccer clubs. In 
international soccer, players are transferred between clubs for a 
negotiated fee, known as a transfer fee.20 Club A will negotiate a 
transfer fee with Club B to buy the employment contract of Player 
X.21 If Club B accepts the offer, Club A can then proceed to negotiate 
the personal terms of the contract with Player X (i.e., wages, bonuses, 
termination, and buy-out clauses).22 If Club A and Player X come to 
an agreement on personal terms, Club A will pay Club B the 
determined transfer fee in exchange for the employment contract for 
Player X.23 
 
20 See generally Andi Thomas, The European Soccer Transfer Market, Explained, SB 
NATION (July 28, 2014, 11:02 AM), http://www.sbnation.com/soccer/2014/7/28/5923187 
/transfer-window-soccer-europe-explained. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
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A. The Separation of Economic and Federative Rights 
TPO is made possible because of the separation of a player’s 
federative and economic rights.24 Owning a player’s federative rights 
allows the club to register that player with the club’s domestic 
Football Association (FA) (e.g., the United States Soccer Federation, 
French Football Federation, or the English Football Association).25 
This registration is required to field the player in official 
competition.26 Federative rights can only be held by a single club.27 
On the other hand, economic rights are the rights to future transfer 
fees from the transfer of the player to another club, and, unlike 
federative rights, economic rights can be divided between multiple 
parties.28 
TPO agreements divide a player’s economic rights between the 
club and a third party. Returning to the previous example of a transfer 
between clubs, Club A wants to buy Player X from Club B. Club B is 
unwilling to sell for anything less than $10 million—which, 
incredibly, is a fairly mundane transfer fee in international soccer 
today. Unfortunately, Club A cannot afford $10 million. Therefore, 
Club A approaches a third party about co-purchasing the player’s 
economic rights. Club A and the third party come to an agreement, by 
which Club A buys 25% of Player X’s economic rights for $2.5 
million and the third party buys the remaining 75% of Player X’s 
economic rights for $7.5 million. In essence, this is a joint venture 
between the two: splitting the initial investment, sharing the risk, and 
sharing the reward. Again, while the player’s economic rights can be 
divided, the player’s federative rights cannot, and in this example they 
go in full to Club A. 
Later on, Club A gets an offer from Club C to buy Player X, and 
the two clubs agree on a transfer fee of $20 million. Club C and 
Player X agree on personal terms, and the transfer is finalized. Of the 
$20 million, Club A will get 25%, or $5 million, and the third party 
will get 75%, or $15 million, proportionate to the 25% and 75% each 
party initially invested in Player X. 
 
24 Reck, supra note 15, at 50. 
25 Victoriano Melero & Romain Soiron, The Dilemma of Third-party Ownership of 
Football Players, SPORTS L. BULL., June–Oct. 2012, at 41, 41. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
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TPO helps clubs acquire players they otherwise could not afford or 
allows a club to mitigate the risk of wasting money on players that do 
not perform as expected, failing to give the club a return on their 
investment. However, this short-term benefit is offset by losing out on 
future transfer profits. 
B. Common Models of Third-Party Ownership 
The two most common models of TPO agreements are the 
investment model and the financing model.29 The investment model 
is the most commonly used30 and was seen in the above example. It 
occurs when a club wants to buy a player but does not have the 
necessary funds. In this case, the club will enter into a TPO agreement 
with a third party, by which the investor pays all or some of the fee 
for the player in exchange for the proportionate share in the future 
transfer of the player.31 The financing model occurs when a club, in 
need of general financing to balance its books (i.e., to cover player 
wages, facilities fees, and other overhead costs needed to stay in 
business), enters into a contractual agreement with a third party by 
which the club receives financing in exchange for a portion of the 
economic rights of one or more of the club’s players.32 
C. Article 18ter: FIFA’s Ban on Third-Party Ownership 
Previously, FIFA’s RSTP Article 18bis only prohibited TPO 
agreements that gave a third party the ability to influence club 
policy.33 Thus, a third party could own a player’s economic rights so 
long as the TPO agreement did not allow the third party influence 
over club policy. As of May 1, 2015, Article 18ter extends the ban 
from just prohibiting TPO agreements that allow for influence, to 
prohibiting all TPO agreements whether or not they allow for 
influence. Article 18ter provides: 
 No club or player shall enter into an agreement with a third party 
whereby a third party is being entitled to participate, either in full or 
in part, in compensation payable in relation to the future transfer of 
 
29 KPMG, supra note 2, at 13. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 FIFA, REGULATIONS ON THE STATUS AND TRANSFER OF PLAYERS 16 art. 18bis 
[hereinafter FIFA RSTP], http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/administration 
/regulations_on_the_status_and_transfer_of_players_en_33410.pdf. 
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a player from one club to another, or is being assigned any rights in 
relation to a future transfer or transfer compensation.34 
Article 18ter is binding at the national level, with each FA required 
to incorporate the ban into its own domestic regulations, and gives the 
FIFA Disciplinary Committee the power to punish clubs and players 
who violate 18ter.35 The FAs of both Argentina and Brazil, the two 
countries in which TPO is most heavily used, have been among the 
first to obey and incorporate FIFA’s Article 18ter into their domestic 
regulations.36 
As originally announced in September 2014, the ban was supposed 
to include a phasing-in period of “three or four years.”37 In reality, 
Article 18ter includes an extremely limited phase-in period, allowing 
pre-existing deals and deals signed between January 1 and April 30, 
2015, which last less than a year to run their course.38 As will be 
detailed in Part III, with such a short phase-in period, investors 
immediately became more reluctant to enter TPO agreements, 
effectively making this phasing-in period irrelevant. 
II 
THIRD-PARTY OWNERSHIP WITHIN THE ECONOMIC CLIMATE OF 
INTERNATIONAL SOCCER 
A. The Current Market Share of TPO 
TPO is most widely utilized in South America, where the practice 
originated, and where the export of Brazilian, Argentinian, and 
Uruguayan players to wealthy European clubs is crucial for clubs’ 
livelihoods.39 Rafael Botelho, the legal and corporate affairs director 
for a leading third-party investment fund, Traffic Sports, believes 
almost all of the players in Brazil are owned by third parties.40 In 
Botelho’s twelve years at Traffic Sports, where he has read, drafted, 
 
34 Circular No. 1464, supra note 6. 
35 Id. 
36 El Gobierno argentino prohíbe los derechos de terceros sobre los futbolistas [The 
Argentine Government Prohibits the Rights of Third Parties Footballers], IUSPORT (Feb. 
20, 2015), http://iusport.com/not/5265/el-gobierno-argentino-prohibe-los-derechos-de        
-terceros-sobre-los-futbolistas/; Tariq Panja, Brazil First to Ban Investor Ownership of 
Soccer Players, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 13, 2015, 12:39 PM PST), http://www.bloomberg.com 
/news articles/2015-01-13/brazil-gets-first-soccer-trade-law-as-ban-makes-impact. 
37 Gibson, supra note 1. 
38 Circular No. 1464, supra note 6. 
39 KPMG, supra note 2, at 33. 
40 Bird, supra note 9. 
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and signed more than five hundred player contracts, he does not recall 
a single contract without any TPO involved.41 A FIFA report showed 
that of the 11,552 international transfers in 2012,42 618 were outgoing 
from Brazilian clubs, the most of any country.43 Argentinian clubs 
came in third, with 436 players transferred, and Uruguayan ninth, 
with 256.44 For the 2012–13 season alone, the revenue generated 
from the transfer of players under twenty-six years old—what would 
generally be considered the peak years of a player’s career—from 
Brazil and Argentina to Europe was $179.49 million.45 Couple the 
amount of money involved in the transfer of players out of South 
America with the fact that virtually all these players are owned by 
third parties, and the money involved is staggering. 
In Europe, it has been estimated that third parties own shares of 
economic rights in somewhere between 723 and 1,107 players, worth 
as much as $1.4 billion.46 TPO is most common in Portugal and the 
Eastern European leagues: Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Hungary, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, and Slovenia. In 
the Eastern European and Portuguese leagues, TPO has an estimated 
market share of 40–50% and 27–36%, respectively.47 TPO’s market 
share is significantly lower outside of Eastern Europe and Portugal, 
with less than 8% in Spain and only 4% in Holland.48 However, due 
to financial difficulties following the most recent financial crisis, the 
practice has become increasingly common in both Spain and 
Portugal.49 Soccer clubs have not been immune to the recent 
recessions that have crippled their respective nations.50 Thus, clubs 
were left searching for alternative sources of financing, and TPO 
presented them with a partial solution. 
 
41 Id. 
42 FIFA, GLOBAL TRANSFER MARKET 2012–HIGHLIGHTS 14 (2013) (on file with 
author). 
43 Id. at 21. 
44 Id. 
45 KPMG, supra note 2, at 36 (conversion calculations from euros to U.S. dollars on 
file with author). 
46 Id. at 22. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 23, 25. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
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B. The Disparate Climate of International Soccer 
Like the rest of society today, international soccer is characterized 
by a growing disparity between the haves and have-nots. International 
soccer is dominated financially and competitively by the top four 
European leagues: the English Premier League, German Bundesliga, 
Spanish La Liga, and Italian Serie A.51 More specifically, it is 
dominated by a handful of top clubs within these leagues. For 
example, Manchester United F.C., Manchester City F.C., and Chelsea 
F.C. of the Premier League; Real Madrid C.F. and F.C. Barcelona of 
La Liga; F.C. Bayern Munich of the Bundesliga; and Juventus F.C. of 
Serie A.52 For this Article, this dominant tier of clubs will be 
collectively referred to as Top Clubs. Dominant on the field, Top 
Clubs earn exponentially more than the remaining 99% of clubs from 
lucrative sponsorship and broadcasting deals, and the few 
mechanisms in place to cause trickle-down revenue are poorly 
enforced.53 
Television revenue, the largest source of revenue for most clubs, is 
primarily distributed based on clubs’ end-of-season league table 
position, with the more successful clubs often getting far more 
revenue than the less successful clubs. For example, in 2013, as the 
top-two teams in La Liga, Barcelona and Real Madrid made $182 
million each and third-place Atlético Madrid made $61 million, while 
the last-place club in La Liga earned only $18.2 million.54 
Revenue in the Premier League is more evenly distributed than in 
Spain, yet a substantial gap remains.55 Following the 2013–14 season, 
the Premier League generated $2.6 billion in television revenue.56 
Fifty percent was distributed evenly between all teams, roughly $36.3 
 
51 See infra Part II.B. 
52 See infra Part II.B. 
53 See Ariel Reck, FIFA’s Solidarity Mechanism and the Impact on South American 
Football, LAWINSPORT (Mar. 13, 2014), http://www.lawinsport.com/blog/argentine-sports 
-law-blog/item/fifa-s-solidarity-mechanism-and-the-impact-on-south-american-football. 
54 Spain to Sell TV Rights, ESPN FC (June 27, 2013), http://www.espnfc.com/story 
/1486306/spain-to-sell-collective-tv-rights-for-liga-clubs. 
55 See generally Owen Gibson, Sky and BT Playing Cat and Mouse Ahead of Premier 
League Bids Process, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 20, 2014, 14:58 GMT), http://www.the 
guardian.com/football/blog/2014/nov/20/sky-bt-premier-league-bids?CMP=twt_gu 
(discussing the escalating bidding war for the UK broadcasting rights to the English 
Premier League). 
56 Scott Phillips, Barclays Premier League Clubs Split $2.6 Billion in Television 
Revenue, BUS. OF SOCCER (May 16, 2014), http://www.businessofsoccer.com/2014/05/16 
/barclays-premier-league-clubs-split-2-6-billion-in-television-revenue/. 
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million each.57 Of the remaining 50%, half was distributed based on 
clubs’ final standing in the league table and the other half was 
distributed based on how many times the team was featured on UK 
television broadcasts.58 Of the 25% of total television revenue 
distributed based on standings, the top four finishers earned $153 
million between them, while the bottom three only received $12.4 
million total.59 
In addition to television revenue, successful clubs get financial 
windfalls by competing in international and continental competitions. 
The top finishers in each of Europe’s domestic leagues qualify to play 
in either the European Champions League or Europa League—
continental tournaments that run concurrent with the regular-league 
season—in addition to their respective domestic league.60 Following 
the 2014–15 season, teams will earn a minimum of $2.6 million 
simply by qualifying for the European Champions League—the more 
prestigious of the two continental tournaments—with the champion 
collecting $13.2 million for winning the final, and lesser sums earned 
for each win en route to the final.61 
The most successful clubs have turned their sporting success into 
global brands with lucrative sponsorship deals. Manchester United, 
competing in the Premier League, has a shirt sponsorship deal worth 
roughly $75 million for 2014–15 alone.62 In contrast, Crystal Palace, 
one of the smaller teams in the Premier League, will earn a decidedly 
more modest $1.2 million from its shirt sponsorship over the same 
period.63 
Financial disparity exists not only within leagues, but also between 
them. Compare the $2.6 billion in television revenue the Premier 
 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 UEFA, REGULATIONS OF THE UEFA EUROPA LEAGUE 2012–15 CYCLE 44 (2014), 
http://www.uefa.com/MultimediaFiles/Download/Regulations/uefaorg/Regulations/02/14 
/11/75/2141175_DOWNLOAD.pdf. 
61 UEFA Champions League Revenue Distribution, UEFA (Sept. 15, 2014, 12:17 
CET), http://www.uefa.com/uefachampionsleague/news/newsid=2146867.html 
(conversion calculations from euros to U.S. dollars on file with author). 
62 Alex Miller & Nick Harris, Man Utd’s Chevrolet Deal Pushes Premier League Shirt 
Values to £191M, SPORTING INTELLIGENCE (July 28, 2014), http://www.sporting 
intelligence.com/2014/07/28/man-utds-chevrolet-deal-pushes-premier-league-shirt-values 
-to-191m-280701/ (conversion calculations from English pounds to U.S. dollars on file 
with author). 
63 Id. (conversion calculations from English pounds to U.S. dollars on file with author). 
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League collected for the 2013–14 season with the Brazilian league’s 
most recent television-rights deal worth only $932 million over three 
seasons.64 A significant gap exists between European leagues as well, 
with Sporting Clube de Portugal, a perennial title contender in 
Portugal, earning a tenth of the television revenue of Manchester 
United and other top Premier League clubs.65 
The gap in television and sponsorship revenue translates into a gap 
in the money spent on transfers, with only a handful of the most 
successful clubs capable of consistently acquiring the best players. 
For example, during the summer of 2014, the top three teams in La 
Liga—Real Madrid, Barcelona, and Atlético Madrid—accounted for 
81% of the $606 million La Liga teams spent on player transfers.66 
The gap in spending power leads to predictable on-field results, and, 
as we will see, only a few clubs realistically have a chance of winning 
their domestic league—and even fewer have a chance of winning 
international competitions. 
Since its founding in 1992, only five clubs have won the Premier 
League, including Blackburn Rover’s sole title in 1994–95, and two 
recent titles for Manchester City.67 Manchester City is an illustration 
of top-tier international soccer’s high barrier to entry. Indeed, its 
success has come only as a result of the club’s new owners Sheikh 
Mansour’s and the Abu Dhabi Group’s willingness to sink $1.6 
billion into the club since 2008.68 
Like the Premier League, the German, Italian, Portuguese, and 
Spanish leagues are all dominated by a few traditional super clubs, 
long entrenched as the dominant market powers. Since 1992, seven 
clubs have won the German Bundesliga, though Bayern Munich and 
Borussia Dortmund account for eighteen of those twenty-three 
titles.69 Over the same period, only five clubs have won the Italian 
 
64 Joao Oliveira, Brazil Soccer Clubs Get TV Revenue Boost With Rede TV! Contract, 
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 11, 2011, 10:03 AM PST), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03 
-11/brazil-soccer-clubs-increase-broadcast-revenue-with-contract-with-rede-tv-.html. 
65 Duff & Panja, supra note 18. 
66 Ian Mount, Soccer Team Spending: A Case of Haves and Have-Nots, FORTUNE 
(Sept. 16, 2014, 5:00 AM EST), http://fortune.com/2014/09/16/soccer-team-spending        
-players-talent/. 
67 History of the Premier League, BARCLAYS PREMIER LEAGUE, http://www.premier 
league.com/en-gb/history/premier-league/ (last updated July 1, 2015). 
68 David Conn, Abu Dhabi Accused of ‘Using Manchester City to Launder Image,’ THE 
GUARDIAN (July 30, 2013, 12:04 EDT), http://www.theguardian.com/football/2013/jul/30 
/manchester-city-human-rights-accusations. 
69 Karel Stokkermans & Andreas Werner, (West) Germany–List of Champions, RSSSF, 
http://www.rsssf.com/tablesd/duitchamp.html (last updated Oct. 29, 2015). 
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Serie A, and two of those champions only have one title each.70 
Similarly, Real Madrid and Barcelona account for eighteen of the last 
twenty-three Spanish La Liga titles.71 At the continental level, since 
its inception as the European Cup in 1955, the European Champions 
League has been won by a club outside the top four leagues only 
fourteen times and only twice in the last twenty seasons.72 
C. TPO’s Role Within Soccer’s Disparate Economic Climate 
In sum, international soccer is characterized by a tremendous 
financial and competitive disparity between what this Article will 
refer to as Top Clubs and Selling Clubs. Top Clubs are the handful of 
traditionally successful clubs that currently dominate the domestic 
and continental competitions, and whose revenue severely outstrips 
those of Selling Clubs. Selling Clubs are all those outside the Top 
Clubs who, without the same revenue from sponsorship, broadcasting, 
or continental tournaments, are forced to sell their best players, the 
sale of which often accounts for these clubs’ primary source of 
revenue.73 
More specifically, there are two, very different philosophies behind 
Selling Clubs. First, there are clubs that find themselves on the brink 
of collapse due to financial mismanagement—often the result of the 
pressure to achieve immediate success—and are forced to sell their 
best or most promising players simply to ensure financial survival. 
And second, there are clubs that acquire, develop, and sell players as 
part of a deliberate business model aimed at long-term financial 
stability—a business model known as FIPG, or financial investment 
on potential growth.74 
 
70 Tamas Karpati & Igor Kramarsic, Italy–List of Champions, RSSSF, http://www.rsssf 
.com/tablesi/italchamp.html (last updated Oct. 29, 2015). 
71 José Vicente Tejedor Carnicero, Spain–List of Champions, RSSSF, http://www.rsssf 
.com/tabless/spanchamp.html (last updated Oct. 29, 2015). 
72 European Cup Roll of Honour, UEFA, http://www.uefa.com/uefachampionsleague 
/history/champions/index.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2014). 
73 For an incredibly detailed and nuanced discussion of the differences in Selling Club 
philosophies, see Capitalising on Player Potential–The Myth of Moneyball in Football, 
LEFT WING SOCCER (Dec. 30, 2013), http://leftwingsoccer.com/fipg/. Of course, because 
it is the Top Clubs who have the finances to consistently afford these talented players and 
the Selling Clubs who must get rid of the talented players, talent in international soccer 
quickly concentrates with the Top Clubs at the tip of the pyramid. 
74 Id. 
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This subtle distinction in Selling Clubs highlights the different 
circumstances Selling Clubs find themselves in and the different 
objectives that TPO has become necessary to achieve. First, TPO 
financing provides a lifeline to many Selling Clubs struggling to 
maintain existence. Second, TPO is a financial tool used by Selling 
Clubs as part of a long-term financial strategy in an attempt to level 
the playing field and challenge the monopoly afforded Top Clubs due 
to systemic financial advantages. 
1. Selling Clubs: Fighting for Survival 
At the very bottom of the world of international soccer are Selling 
Clubs struggling to stay in business at all, many of whom rely on TPO 
for the most basic financial survival.75 In the words of Daniel Cravo, 
a lawyer for Brazilian clubs who find themselves in this situation, 
“[w]e use this kind of asset, the available asset that we have, on a 
large scale in Brazil . . . . We don’t have plenty of money to share 
concerning television rights or sponsorship . . . .”76 
To make matters worse, banks are reluctant to loan money to 
Selling Clubs, particularly in the wake of the 2008 credit crisis.77 
According to Ray Ranson, the president of R2 Assets Management 
Ltd., an investment fund with roughly $75 million invested in TPO 
agreements, “[t]he clubs need it,” insisting that third-party owners 
provide a financial lifeline to cash-strapped clubs.78 Indeed, many 
Selling Clubs are completely reliant on TPO, so much so that it is 
possible entire leagues could collapse without it.79 
2. Selling Clubs: Striving for Relevancy 
Second are the Selling Clubs who are on the cusp of achieving 
Top-Club status. They are financially stable, yet lack the resources to 
break into the Top Clubs. These Selling Clubs will use TPO financing 
to buy and retain talented players and modernize their facilities. 
Take, for example, the recent success of Atlético Madrid. 
Competing in Spain’s La Liga, Atlético has a well-known history 
 
75 Simon Evans, Third Party Owner Ban Would be Bad for Brazil–Club Lawyer, 
REUTERS (Oct. 22, 2014, 1:14 AM BST), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/10/22/uk         
-soccer-fifa-tpo-idUKKCN0IB00R20141022. 
76 Id. 
77 Duff & Panja, supra note 18. 
78 Id. 
79 Bird, supra note 9. 
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using TPO, accounting for roughly 30% of the club’s financing.80 As 
mentioned, Spain’s La Liga has perhaps the greatest wealth disparity 
in all of Europe, with Barcelona and Real Madrid essentially trading 
the league title back and forth for the past twenty seasons.81 With 
TPO investment, Atlético could acquire and hold on to star players 
otherwise outside their financial means, which eventually culminated 
in their breaking La Liga’s duopoly to be crowned champions in 
2014.82 
Awareness of TPO exploded in England after the transfers of 
Carlos Tevez and Javier Mascherano from Sport Club Corinthians 
Paulista of Brazil to the English club West Ham F.C. in 2006.83 West 
Ham is a historic English club, with a youth academy that has 
produced some of the best English players.84 However, in the current 
economic climate even storied clubs like West Ham have been 
brought to their knees, and have needed to find alternative financing 
methods in an attempt to keep up with the Top Clubs; TPO is just 
that. 
Brazilian clubs use TPO to hold on to their best players in the face 
of interest from top European clubs. The Brazilian player Neymar da 
Silva Santos Jr., known to soccer fans as Neymar or Neymar Jr., is 
currently a star forward for Barcelona, having been bought by the 
club from the Brazilian club Santos for roughly $90 million in 2013.85 
In 2009, when then seventeen-year-old Neymar had barely broken 
into the first team at Santos, the club feared they would lose their 
talented youngster to a European club able to pay higher wages and 
provide a grander stage.86 To hold on to their budding star, Santos put 
together a vastly improved contract offer, made possible only by 
 
80 Duff & Panja, supra note 18. 
81 Carnicero, supra note 71. 
82 Duff & Panja, supra note 18; Sid Lowe, Atlético Madrid Win More than the League 
with ‘Impossible’ La Liga Title, THE GUARDIAN (May 19, 2014, 9:44 EDT), http://www 
.theguardian.com/football/blog/2014/may/19/atletico-madrid-la-liga-title-impossible. 
83 David Ornstein, West Ham Charged Over Mascherano and Tevez Deals, THE 
GUARDIAN (Mar. 2, 2007, 19:45 EST), http://www.theguardian.com/football/2007/mar/03 
/newsstory.sport8. 
84 Hammers Academy–Big Business for the Club, W. HAM UNITED N. AM. ACAD., 
http://www.westhamacademyinternational.com/Academy_Graduates.html (last visited 
Nov. 8, 2015). 
85 Duarte, supra note 14 (conversion calculation from English pounds to U.S. dollars on 
file with author). 
86 Id. 
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selling 40% of Neymar’s economic rights to the investment fund DIS 
Esporte Group.87 
Without TPO investment, Selling Clubs would be unable to acquire 
new players or hold on to their own talented players in the face of big-
money offers from Top Clubs. Thus, without TPO investment, Selling 
Clubs would lose what little ability they currently have to compete 
with Top Clubs. 
3. The Financial and Competitive Necessity of TPO for Selling Clubs 
According to Luís Godinho Lopes, former president of Sporting 
Clube de Portugal, Selling Clubs see TPO as the only way to level the 
playing field in the increasingly disparate world of international 
soccer.88 The CEO of Doyen Sports—an investment fund with TPO 
agreements with clubs around Europe—Nelio Lucas poses the 
relevant question: “Do we want a world where only Barcelona, Real 
Madrid, Bayern or other ‘giants’ win trophies due to the distorted 
marketplace or do we want smaller clubs like Atletico Madrid, 
Seville, Porto, Benfica, PSV or other similar [clubs] to challenge 
them and provide competition?”89 
The defenders of TPO are not limited to the clubs and investors 
who directly benefit from the practice. The Spanish La Liga argues 
that TPO is necessary for the financial and competitive survival of 
Spanish clubs.90 In fact, as will be detailed further on,91 La Liga, 
together with the Portuguese Primeira Liga, has mounted a formal 
legal complaint against FIFA. The two leagues claim that 18ter 
violates EU competition law by limiting investment in Selling Clubs, 
therefore impairing their ability to compete with Top Clubs, limiting 
wages, and entrenching the dominant market players.92 
 
87 Id. 
88 Duff & Panja, supra note 18. 
89 Tariq Panja, FIFA Investor Ban Hurts Small Teams, Soccer’s Doyen Says, 
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 29, 2014, 5:48 AM PDT), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-09  
-29/fifa-investor-ban-hurts-small-teams-soccer-s-doyen-says.html. 
90 The Spanish and Portuguese Leagues Denounce FIFA’s TPO Ban to the European 
Commission, LIGA DE FÚTBOL PROFESIONAL (Feb. 9, 2015) [hereinafter LFP], 
http://www.lfp.es/en/news/the-spanish-and-portuguese-leagues-denounce-fifas-tpo-ban-to 
-the-european-commission?action=redirect_site&continue=&no_show_redirect_site=on. 
91 See infra Part III.B. 
92 Blog Symposium, FIFA Must Regulate TPO, Not Ban It. The Point of View of La 
Liga, ASSER INT’L SPORTS L. BLOG (Apr. 14, 2015) [hereinafter The Point of View of La 
Liga], http://www.asser.nl/SportsLaw/Blog/post/fifa-must-regulate-tpo-not-ban-it-by-the    
-spanish-football-league-la-liga#_ftnref1. 
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D. A Sixty-Two Percent Return on Investment 
The buying and selling of players’ economic rights has proved to 
be lucrative for third parties. Traffic Sports, one of the most 
prominent investment funds, made a 62% return on its initial 
investment of $50 million in twenty-one players between 2008 and 
2012.93 In one instance, Traffic spent $6.8 million for a share of the 
economic rights of nineteen-year-old Brazilian Keirrison de Souza 
Carneiro; eight months later, the player was transferred to F.C. 
Barcelona for $19.3 million, and Traffic’s share of the player’s 
economic rights earned them a 114% return on the initial 
investment.94 Ray Ranson confirms that his company routinely makes 
returns of about 50% in two years.95 With such a high rate of return, 
firms are investing incredible amounts into TPO agreements. Vibrac 
Corp., a closely held lender in the British Virgin Islands, invested as 
much as $245 million in 2014, while Doyen Sports has invested a 
somewhat more modest $130 million in TPO agreements over the 
past two years.96 
E. Why Ban TPO? 
As mentioned at the outset, TPO is a highly contentious topic, and, 
while there are many advocates of the practice and countless clubs 
who rely on the financing, there are powerful opponents who advance 
legitimate justifications for banning TPO.97 Opponents, mostly 
European-based, argue that not only is TPO actually harmful 
financially—siphoning money out of clubs—but, by giving third 
parties influence in the transfer policies of clubs, TPO both 
undermines contractual stability between player and club and 
facilitates match-fixing.98 
 
93 Duff & Panja, supra note 18. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Alex Duff, Soccer Transfers Fueled by Secretive Loans Beat UEFA Bid, 
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 30, 2014, 2:01 AM PDT), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-09  
-29/soccer-transfers-fueled-by-secretive-loans-beat-uefa-clampdown.html. 
97 Gibson, supra note 1; Carol Couse, The International Transfer System and the 
Principle of Specificity of Sport, SPORTS L. BULL., June–Oct. 2012, at 75, 80. 
98 Couse, supra note 97, at 80; Gibson, supra note 1. 
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1. The Long-Term Financial Harm of TPO 
A chief concern with TPO is that it encourages short-termism and 
overreliance on outside funding.99 Bruno de Carvalho, the current 
president of Sporting Clube de Portugal, a club with well-known ties 
to TPO, describes TPO as a monster created by clubs from which they 
can no longer escape.100 According to de Carvalho, TPO agreements 
trap clubs in a “vicious cycle of debt and dependence,” bleeding clubs 
of their money, with clubs almost always losing money over the 
course of a TPO agreement.101 Says de Carvalho, “[p]eople are very 
happy to sell a player for £50m, but for the club it is £1m or £2m. 
And they paid more than that in the salary of one year. Almost all the 
time you lose money. This is mathematics.”102 Thus begins a 
perpetual cycle. Selling Clubs rely on TPO investment to finance 
player acquisitions, but without the rights to the proceeds from later 
selling the player, the Selling Club cannot profit from sales. Without 
profiting from sales, and having to pay wages over the course of the 
TPO agreement, the Selling Clubs could ultimately lose money from 
these arrangements. In this way, the Selling Club is worse off 
financially after the agreement than they were going into it. Hence, 
TPO agreements can make Selling Clubs increasingly dependent on 
TPO financing going forward. 
2. Third-Party Influence 
In addition to the financial harm, there are concerns that TPO 
creates conflicts of interests for club owners and officials, and 
between agents and the players they represent. Opponents of the 
practice claim that TPO agreements give third-party investors undue 
influence over club policies, subordinating the interests of club and 
 
99 Daniel Geey, Third Party Investment from a UK Perspective, ASSER INT’L SPORTS 
L. BLOG (Apr. 17, 2015), http://www.asser.nl/SportsLaw/Blog/post/blog-symposium         
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SPORTS L. BLOG (Apr. 15, 2015), http://www.asser.nl/SportsLaw/Blog/post/blog               
-symposium-third-party-entitlement-to-shares-of-transfer-fees-problems-and-solutions-by 
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Ownership to Go Unchecked, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 23, 2014, 7:49 EDT), 
http://www.theguardian.com/football/2014/sep/23/fifa-third-party-ownership. 
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(Oct. 3, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/sport/0/football/29474696 (Converted into U.S. 
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player to a third party’s financial interest, an outcome that can 
facilitate match-fixing in international soccer.103 
There are two ways third parties can use TPO agreements to 
subjugate the clubs’ interests to their own. First, contractual 
provisions inserted into the agreements can force clubs to sell the 
player if a bid comes in at a high enough price.104 Examples below: 
Buy-Sell Clauses: In the event of an offer for the player from 
another club, some time at or above an agreed-upon amount, if the 
third party wants to accept the offer, the club must either accept it 
or buy the third party’s share for the same amount the third party 
would have received had the offer been accepted.105 
Reimbursement on non-transfer of player: If the player is not 
transferred by a certain date, the club will reimburse the third 
party’s investment, plus interest.106 
Investment shifts on non-transfer of player: If the player is not 
transferred by the end of the employment contract between club 
and player, the investor’s share in the player shifts to another 
player.107 
These and similar provisions give third parties direct, contractual 
influence over club policy. Ray Ranson of R2 Assets confirms that he 
never enters TPO agreements without including contractual 
provisions giving his company direct influence over club transfer 
policy.108 
The second means of undue third-party influence comes from 
investors leveraging clubs’ financial necessity and resulting 
dependency on TPO investment into indirect influence over club 
policy or over the game-day performance of players and coaches. 
Third parties could assert this through gentlemen’s agreements—
 
103 Daniel Geey, Third Party Player Ownership: A UK Perspective, SPORTS L. BULL., 
June–Oct. 2012, at 55, 58–59. 
104 See KPMG, supra note 2, at 38. 
105 Ariel Reck, Do “Buy-Sell” Clauses in Third Party Ownership Agreements 
Constitute Undue Influence Under FIFA’s Art 18bis?, LAWINSPORT (Sept. 1, 2014), 
http://www.lawinsport.com/blog/argentine-sports-law-blog/item/do-buy-sell-clauses-in      
-third-party-ownership-agreements-constitute-undue-influence-under-FIFA-s-art-18bis 
#references. 
106 KPMG, supra note 2, at 38. 
107 Id. 
108 Duff & Panja, supra note 18. 
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meetings that take place off the record, where the parties come to 
under-the-table arrangements. These means of indirect influence are 
much harder to track and prevent. Thus, compared to the direct, 
contractual means of influence, it is the indirect influence leveraged 
by third parties that is the real concern.109 
As touched on above, whether direct or indirect, third-party 
influence presents two dangers to international soccer. First, it can 
undermine contractual stability and the development of young 
players.110 Second, it can facilitate match-fixing.111 
a. Undermining Contractual Stability and Development of Club and 
Player 
The third party only profits if the player they invest in is 
transferred for a fee high enough to recoup the initial investment. 
Therefore, the third party’s only interest is to transfer the player to the 
highest bidder. However, this can go against the wishes and interests 
of the club or the player.112 If a third party can dictate the transfer 
policy of a club, the contract between player and club is virtually 
meaningless. For the club, it becomes impossible to plan the long-
term development of a team if they cannot control their transfer 
policy or rely on their contracts. For the player, with their future in 
the hands of a profit-seeking third party and treated simply as a 
financial asset, there can be no certainty or stability in the player’s 
own professional development or personal future. 
A recent and extreme example of undue third-party interest comes 
from a TPO agreement between Sporting Clube de Portugal and 
Doyen Sports.113 Sporting’s president, de Carvalho, claimed the club 
had no interest in selling their player Marcos Rojo to Manchester 
United.114 However, Doyen, owning 75% of Rojo’s economic rights, 
used the TPO agreement with Sporting to “manipulate” the club’s 
 
109 Fernando Veiga Gomes, Third Party Player Ownership, Again!, SPORTS L. BULL., 
June–Oct. 2012, at 63, 64. 
110 Geey, supra note 103, at 59. 
111 Richard Andrews, Third Party Ownership–Risk or Reward?, SPORTS L. BULL., 
June–Oct. 2012, at 33, 35. 
112 See David Conn, Marcos Rojo Deal Prompts Third-party Revolt from Sporting 
Lisbon President, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 10, 2014, 14:34 EDT), http://www.theguardian 
.com/football/2014/sep/10/sporting-lisbon-third-party-ownership-attack-marcos-rojo          
-manchester-united. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
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decisions and force the sale of Rojo.115 According to de Carvalho, 
Doyen executives would impersonate Sporting officials when meeting 
with other clubs to arrange for the player’s transfer behind Sporting’s 
back.116 De Carvalho maintains Sporting had no interest in selling 
Rojo, but, in the end, the pressure became too much.117 
Similarly, TPO can undermine the development of young players. 
Young players with high potential can demand some of the greatest 
transfer fees from Top Clubs, making them inviting targets for third-
party investors. Every player dreams of playing for a Top Club. 
However, moving too early can hurt the development of a young 
player. Often it would be better for their career to remain at a smaller 
club for an extra year or two, developing professionally and 
personally, without the expectations that come with playing for a Top 
Club. 
None of this is of concern to a third-party investor. The third 
party’s interest is limited to the payoff from getting a talented youth 
to a Top Club as quickly as possible, while their potential is still high 
and their expected career is long, regardless of whether the move is 
good for the player’s long-term career. 
b. Conflicts of Interest and Match-Fixing 
The concern is that conflicts of interest arise when a third party 
owns economic rights in a player who competes against a club in 
which the same third party has an ownership stake or other interest.118 
Even by instructing a single player to get sent off, to allow an attacker 
to get by, or miss a seemingly easy chance to score himself, a third 
party could drastically alter the course of a game.119 A third party can 
own the economic rights of players on teams across a league, 
potentially undermining the competitive integrity of the whole 
league.120 UEFA and the European Parliament have both made it 
 
115 Id. 
116 Sporting Lisbon President Tells of Pressure from Marcos Rojo Owners, THE 
GUARDIAN (Oct. 3, 2014, 7:49 EDT), http://www.theguardian.com/football/2014/oct/03 
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118 Geey, supra note 103, at 59. 
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clear that eliminating match-fixing and securing the integrity of 
sporting competitions is one of their highest priorities.121 
In sum, TPO has become an invaluable asset for Selling Clubs in 
the disparate economic climate of international soccer. Long-
entrenched European Top Clubs dominate competitively, which in 
turn leads them to reap exponentially more lucrative financial returns, 
amounting to a viscous cycle maintaining these clubs’ dominance. 
The competitive and financial gaps between Top Clubs and Selling 
Clubs is continuing to grow, and as it does, TPO has become 
increasingly necessary for Selling Clubs trying to maintain 
competitiveness, or to stay in business at all. There are potential 
dangers that come with TPO—long-term financial harm, contractual 
instability, and conflicts of interests—and opponents of the practice 
are right to highlight these dangers. That said, eliminating TPO 
altogether could have drastic ramifications on the already disparate 
economics of international soccer. 
III 
THE REPERCUSSIONS OF AND REACTIONS TO FIFA’S BAN 
Whether or not opponents of TPO are right in their attack on the 
practice, the dire financial straits Selling Clubs find themselves in 
today cannot be overemphasized. For some Selling Clubs, TPO 
investment is the only thing allowing them to remain competitive, the 
only thing maintaining some semblance of competition in domestic 
and international soccer. For many more, TPO investment is 
necessary simply to stay in business. TPO is a widespread practice 
because of the financial necessity facing Selling Clubs, and banning 
TPO does nothing to alleviate clubs’ financial necessity. Instead, 
Selling Clubs who have relied on TPO financing for so long, are 
abruptly forced to find new means of financing. This system shock 
could have disastrous consequences. Indeed, Marcos Motta, a 
Brazilian soccer lawyer and a member of FIFA’s working group on 
TPO, believes banning TPO “would simply collapse Brazilian 
football.”122 While the effects of losing TPO will perhaps hit hardest 
 
121 Match-Fixing Resolution, UEFA (Apr. 11, 2013, 16:08 CET), http://www.uefa.org 
/stakeholders/european-union/news/newsid=1940354.html#match+fixing+resolution. 
122 Bird, supra note 9; see also ROLL CALL: MEETING OF THE “WORKING GROUP ON 
THIRD-PARTY OWNERSHIP OF PLAYERS’ ECONOMIC RIGHTS,” FIFA (Sept. 2, 2014), 
available at http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/footballgovernance/02/46 
/40/53/02.09.2014rollcalltpo_neutral.pdf; Working Group on Third-party Ownership 
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in Brazil and other South American countries, its effects will also be 
felt by Selling Clubs in Portugal, Eastern Europe, and Spain. 
And, unfortunately, the phase-in period for Article 18ter does little 
to mitigate the harm. With typical TPO agreements lasting five years, 
even with the three- to four-year phase-in period FIFA originally 
announced,123 TPO investment was expected to dry up as soon as the 
ban was originally announced in September 2014.124 Indeed, at least 
one Brazilian investment fund has put new investment on hold.125 
Motta predicts this reaction is indicative of how other investors will 
respond to the ban, meaning TPO investment could quickly dry up.126 
The abrupt loss of a vital source of funding for Selling Clubs will 
have drastic effects on international soccer, and there are two 
potential repercussions to investigate here. The first is that clubs and 
third parties will find ways of circumventing the ban, making the 
practice more dangerous than it currently is. The second, more 
interesting, possibility is a legal challenge against FIFA under EU 
law—something already initiated by La Liga and the Primeira Liga. 
Of course, a third outcome exists: that TPO investment will dry up 
and Selling Clubs will no longer be able to compete or stay in 
business at all. 
A. Circumventing the Ban 
Ariel Reck, an Argentine sports lawyer, questions the effectiveness 
of FIFA’s ban and believes third parties will either find creative ways 
to emulate the effects of TPO agreements or that banning them will 
only make the practice more secretive and dangerous.127 For example, 
without TPO, we could see an increase in the use of “bridge transfers” 
of players, with third parties essentially using—or creating their 
own—proxy clubs to transfer players to before loaning them or 
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selling them to a final destination.128 Clubs have already been 
sanctioned for using bridge transfers,129 but the practice remains 
prevalent in leagues across the world.130 
A second way to circumvent Article 18ter would be for the club—
after a secret agreement with a third party—to assign the transfer 
profits to the player in question, and from there, for the transfer 
profits to be transferred to the third party.131 From the language of 
Article 18ter, it does not seem that players are considered third 
parties, and, thus, assignments to the players may not be scrutinized 
as heavily.132 
A further complicating factor is that, in most countries, even if the 
contract would be invalid under the country’s respective FA, the 
contract could still be valid under civil law.133 FIFA has the authority 
to punish players and clubs, but not third parties.134 Therefore, it is 
possible to imagine a situation where a Selling Club—out of 
necessity—enters a TPO agreement despite Article 18ter, resulting in 
a very difficult situation for the club. Indeed, because FIFA can only 
sanction the players and clubs involved, not third parties, and because 
the contract would be valid under civil law, third parties could use 
threats of disclosing the agreement to FIFA as a means of exerting 
even greater pressure against the club. In the end, FIFA’s ban does 
nothing to ease the dire circumstances that make Selling Clubs turn to 
TPO to begin with. By banning the practice—as opposed to 
regulating TPO—FIFA has arguably only made Selling Clubs more 
vulnerable to third parties than they already are. 
B. The Legal Challenge Against FIFA’s Ban 
The second possibility is a legal challenge against FIFA and 
Article 18ter. Jean-Louis Dupont—the lawyer behind the monumental 
Bosman ruling, which secured free agency for international soccer 
 
128 Id. For more information on how bridge transfers work, see Ariel Reck, What is a 
“Bridge Transfer” in Football?, LAWINSPORT (Apr. 30, 2014), http://www.lawinsport 
.com/sports/football/item/what-is-a-bridge-transfer-in-football. 
129 See Racing Club Ass’n Civil v. FIFA, CAS 2014/A/3536, Arbital Award ¶¶ 10.1, 
10.3 (Court of Arbitration for Sport, May 5, 2015), http://www.tas-cas.org/fileadmin/user 
_upload/Award_Final_3536__internet_.pdf. 
130 Reck, supra note 127. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
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players135—believes a legal challenge under EU competition law has 
a very good chance of succeeding.136 Dupont does not believe the 
restriction in this case—Article 18ter—is justified.137 He stresses 
robust protections for freedom of competition and prohibitions against 
unreasonable restraints on competition that exist under EU law. In 
fact, at the time of writing, the Spanish and Portuguese leagues have 
already lodged a formal complaint with the European Commission, 
arguing that banning TPO is an unjustified and disproportionate 
restriction on competition.138 
In particular, the antitrust claim is that by banning TPO, the lack of 
investment in Selling Clubs will prevent those clubs from acquiring 
new players or holding onto current players.139 The European Court 
of Justice (ECJ), where the case would likely be heard,140 has defined 
players as the materials necessary to create a competitive product in 
the soccer markets.141 Thus, by limiting clubs’ ability to acquire 
players, FIFA is limiting the ability of these clubs to compete in the 
soccer markets, unfairly entrenching Top Clubs as the dominant 
market forces.142 
Dupont, together with Javier Berastegi, is behind the complaint by 
the Spanish and Portuguese leagues.143 Spanish sports and 
entertainment lawyer Felix Plaza seconds the complaint against 
Article 18ter, arguing that the ban is “restrictive and goes against the 
free movement of capital,” and, therefore, “FIFA has gone past what 
is reasonable and it’s going to create problems.”144 
Reinforcing the argument that Article 18ter is unreasonable, there 
are signs indicating FIFA’s decision was politically motivated, as 
 
135 Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Societes de Football Ass’n v. Bosman, 
1995 E.CR. I-4921; Tom Fordyce, 10 Years Since Bosman, BBC: SPORT (Dec. 14, 2005, 
22:35 GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport2/hi/football/4528732.stm. 
136 Sinnott, supra note 16. 
137 Id. 
138 LFP, supra note 90. 
139 Id.; The Point of View of La Liga, supra note 92. 
140 See infra Part III.B.2. 
141 Case C-264/98, Balog v. Royal Charleroi Sporting Club ASBL, 2001, removed from 
the register on Dec. 4, 2001, paras. 86–87. The Balog case was settled out of court and 
therefore removed from the register. 
142 The Point of View of La Liga, supra note 92. 
143 LFP, supra note 90. 
144 Alex Duff, Spanish Soccer Will Challenge FIFA Ban on Alternative Financing, 
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 16, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2015-01-16/spanish          
-soccer-will-challenge-fifa-ban-on-alternative-financing.html. 
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opposed to a decision based on empirical studies and balanced 
consideration regarding the potential effects of banning TPO. La Liga 
highlights the following signs of political motivation: that two 
independent studies have come out in favor of TPO; there were no 
reports or other investigations by FIFA to support a ban; FIFA’s 
Working Party on TPO only met on the subject once; FIFA did not 
consult other FAs or governments in reaching their decision; and 
finally, FIFA’s General Assembly itself concluded TPO was a 
complex issue requiring further investigation.145 Considering all this, 
it is somewhat concerning that FIFA’s Executive Committee was so 
quick to ban the practice. 
1. Governing Law: Articles 101 and 102 TFEU 
Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the 
European Union (Articles 101 and 102 TFEU) would govern a claim 
that FIFA’s ban is anticompetitive.146 Together, Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU prohibit any agreement between undertakings, decisions by 
associations of undertakings, and concerted practices by one or more 
undertakings that may affect trade and are intended to or will in fact 
prevent, restrict, or distort competition.147 Therefore, in order for 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU to govern, there must be an undertaking 
or association of undertakings, an agreement or decision, a market, 
and an anti-competitive effect on that market.148 
An undertaking is any entity engaged in an economic activity, 
which includes employment procurement.149 The ECJ has held that 
FIFA, other continental federations such as UEFA, and domestic FAs 
are each simultaneously undertakings in their own right and an 
association of undertakings; thus, they are subject to Articles 101 and 
102 TFEU.150 In Balog, the ECJ reasoned that a set of transfer 
regulations by FIFA was a decision under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU 
because it was issued by FIFA’s Executive Committee and had 
binding legal effect on FIFA members.151 
 
145 The Point of View of La Liga, supra note 92. 
146 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union arts. 
101–102, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47 [hereinafter TFEU]. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. 
149 Case C-41/90, Hofner v. Macrotron GmbH, 1991 E.C.R. I-1979, ¶ 21. 
150 Case C-264/98, Balog v. Royal Charleroi Sporting Club ASBL, 2001, removed from 
the register on Dec. 4, 2001, para. 57. 
151 Id. at para. 66. 
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Like the transfer regulations in Balog, FIFA’s ban is from the 
Executive Committee and, as a part of FIFA’s RSTP, is binding on 
FIFA members.152 Therefore, FIFA’s ban would be a decision by an 
undertaking for the purposes of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. 
Alternatively, because the ECJ simultaneously considers FIFA an 
undertaking and an association of undertakings, FIFA’s ban could 
also be subject to Articles 101 and 102 TEFU as a decision by an 
association of undertakings.153 
In Balog, the ECJ defined three relevant markets in soccer.154 First 
is the contest market, where the product is the soccer game contested 
on the field between two clubs; a joint production by the two clubs, 
where the consumer is the supporter who pays for game-day 
entertainment.155 In general, the most valuable products would be 
exciting games contested between two competitive clubs. Next is the 
secondary market, the market for secondary goods such as 
sponsorships, broadcast deals, tickets, merchandise, and any other 
goods the club can commercialize to exploit the value of the product 
the club produces in the contest market.156 A more valuable product 
in the contest market increases the value of a club’s goods in the 
secondary market.157 The third market is the transfer market, where 
clubs compete over the supply of players—what the ECJ considers 
the raw materials required for clubs to produce a quality product in 
the contest market.158 In the transfer market, clubs compete to acquire 
the players necessary to have a team capable of competing with other 
clubs to produce a compelling contest market product and achieve on-
field success. To compete in the transfer market, a club needs both the 
money to pay high transfer fees and offer large wages and to be 
competitive in the contest market in order to offer potential players 
the chance to compete for championships. 
By restricting investment in clubs, FIFA’s ban on TPO would 
directly restrict clubs’ ability to compete in the transfer market, which 
would affect their competition in the contest and secondary markets 
as well. In sum, FIFA’s ban would restrict competition in the 
 
152 Circular No. 1464, supra note 6. 
153 Balog, C-264/98 at para. 60. 
154 Id. at para. 76. 
155 Id. at para. 78. 
156 Id. at paras. 77–78. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. at paras. 86–87. 
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following way: a restriction on investment in clubs would make them 
less competitive in the transfer market, making it harder for Selling 
Clubs to compete to bring on talented new players and to hold on to 
their own players. Making it harder for clubs to bring in players 
equates to a restriction on the investment in the raw materials 
necessary to create a competitive product in the contest market; that 
is, a viable squad of players. Preventing clubs from assembling a 
viable competitive squad leads to: the entrenchment of the current 
dominant players, a reduction on the number of transfers, a reduction 
on the numbers of players employed, a deflationary effect on players’ 
salaries, and less competition in the secondary market for derivative 
goods. 
By restricting Selling Clubs’ ability to compete in the transfer 
market, FIFA’s ban will restrict competition in both the contest 
market and secondary market. Unable to acquire talented players, the 
games produced by a club will be of lower value, making their 
secondary products less valuable as well. The three relevant markets 
are interconnected, and FIFA’s ban restricts competition in each. 
Of course, Articles 101 and 102 TFEU only prohibit unreasonable 
restrictions on competition.159 Therefore, a crucial part of each side’s 
argument will be the reasonableness of Article 18ter, that is, whether 
the restrictions are justified by legitimate objectives; whether the 
restrictions are necessary to achieve those justifying, legitimate 
objectives; and finally, whether the restrictions in question are 
proportionate to achieve those legitimate objectives.160 
2. Parties and Court 
Under Article 105 TFEU, the European Commission (EC) is the 
primary monitor and enforcer of EU competition law.161 Accordingly, 
the Portuguese and Spanish FAs have filed their complaint with the 
EC.162 The EC’s decision can be appealed to the ECJ, a body with the 
jurisdiction to respond to a private party’s request for judicial review 
of the actions of an EU institution.163 Alternatively, the initial claim 
could have been made in a national court, where the party could 
motion for a preliminary hearing by the ECJ under Article 267 
 
159 TFEU, supra note 146, at arts. 101–02. 
160 Infra Part III.B.3. 
161 TFEU, supra note 146, at art. 105. 
162 LFP, supra note 90. 
163 TFEU, supra note 146, at art. 263. 
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TFEU.164 Article 267 TFEU gives the ECJ jurisdiction to give 
binding opinions on unsettled questions of EU treaty law.165 It is up 
to the complainant to convince the court that the question at hand 
requires a preliminary hearing, and with no prior cases on point, there 
is a very good chance the ECJ would grant a preliminary hearing if 
this case goes to a national court.166 Thus, even if the EC were to 
dismiss the claim, the Spanish and Portuguese leagues could move the 
case to a national court and ask for a preliminary hearing by the ECJ. 
3. FIFA’s Counter: Is This Restriction on Competition Justified 
Under Meca-Medina? 
As mentioned, Articles 101 and 102 TFEU do not prohibit any 
restriction on competition, only unreasonable restrictions.167 The idea 
that banning TPO would restrict competition is not in question; 
limiting investment into clubs naturally restricts their ability to 
compete, especially in this case, where TPO is one of the few 
available sources of financing for Selling Clubs. The question is 
whether such restriction on competition is unreasonable or, instead, is 
justified by legitimate objectives. In Wouters, the ECJ held that even 
rules that restrict competition can be justified by legitimate EU 
objectives.168 The ECJ has applied this principle to sports rules that 
restrict competition, perhaps most famously in Meca-Medina.169 
Following Meca-Medina, the test to determine whether a restriction 
on competition is justified is known as the Meca-Medina test.170 
The Meca-Medina test requires a case-by-case assessment of the 
overall context and justifications behind the restriction in question.171 
The Meca-Medina test has three prongs, and the restriction in 
question must satisfy each prong to satisfy the test.172 First, the 
restriction must be justified by pursuing legitimate objectives as 
 
164 Id. at art. 267. 
165 Id. 
166 See The EU and Sport: Background and Context–Accompanying Document to the 
White Paper on Sport 70–76 (Comm’n of European Cmtys. Staff Working Document, 
SEC/2007/0935 final, Nov. 7, 2007) [hereinafter Staff Working Document], http://eur-lex 
.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52007SC0935&from=EN. 
167 Supra Part III.B.1. 
168 Case C-309/99, Wouters, 2002 E.C.R. I-01577, para. 97. 
169 Case C-519/04, Meca-Medina v. Comm’n, 2006 E.C.R. I-06991. 
170 Staff Working Document, supra note 166, at § 3.4(b). 
171 Meca-Medina, 2006 E.C.R. I-06991 at para. 42. 
172 Id.; Staff Working Document, supra note 166, at annex 1, § 2.1.5. 
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defined by the EU.173 Second, there cannot be nonrestrictive 
alternatives.174 And third, the restriction cannot be overly restrictive; 
that is, it must be proportionate and cannot be more restrictive than 
necessary to secure its justifying, legitimate objectives.175 
a. Meca-Medina’s First Prong: Legitimate Objectives 
In order to satisfy the Meca-Medina test, FIFA will have to show 
its restriction pursues legitimate sporting objectives. The EU has 
outlined a number of legitimate sporting objectives.176 Part II 
presented arguments FIFA would use to justify banning TPO: that 
TPO creates undue third-party influence over clubs to facilitate 
conflicts of interests and match-fixing, undermines contractual 
stability and the development of young players; and encourages 
unsustainable business practices with long-term financial harm.177 
However, Ariel Reck, the aforementioned Argentine sports lawyer, 
and La Liga each argue FIFA’s justifications are flawed.178 
When it comes to preventing match-fixing and protecting the 
integrity of the game, La Liga questions FIFA’s commitment to this 
cause when FIFA does nothing to regulate the loaning of players from 
one club to another, has deregulated the representation of players, and 
has accepted that a few incredibly powerful agents represent the star 
players playing for opposing clubs.179 Each of these situations creates 
conflicts of interest similar to those FIFA warns that TPO creates, but 
there has been no similar action on any of these fronts. 
First, the loan system allows clubs to maintain ownership of a 
player while sending the player to play for another club, either a club 
in the same league or a different league.180 The fear La Liga hints at 
is that the loaning club could maintain influence over the loaned 
 
173 Meca-Medina, 2006 E.C.R. I-06991 at para. 42; Staff Working Document, supra 
note 166, at annex 1, § 2.1.5. 
174 Meca-Medina, 2006 E.C.R. I-06991 at para. 42; Staff Working Document, supra 
note 166, at annex 1, § 2.1.5. 
175 Meca-Medina, 2006 E.C.R. I-06991 at para. 42; Staff Working Document, supra 
note 166, at annex 1, § 2.1.5. 
176 Staff Working Document, supra note 166, at annex 1, § 2.1.5; Couse, supra note 97, 
at 77, 80. 
177 Gibson, supra note 1; E-mail from Ariel Reck, Founder and Partner, Reck Sports 
Law, to author (Oct. 24, 2014, 5:37 AM PST) (on file with author); see supra Parts II.E.1–
2. 
178 E-mail from Ariel Reck to author, supra note 177. 
179 The Point of View of La Liga, supra note 92. 
180 See Thomas, supra note 20. 
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player, creating the same conflicts of interest and match-fixing 
concerns FIFA argues come with TPO. The conflicts are obvious if 
the loaner and loanee clubs play each other with said player on the 
field, but also if the two were in direct competition with each other; 
any game the player participated in would provide opportunity for the 
player to sabotage the loaner club. 
Second, the fact that only a few powerful agents—men such as 
Portuguese super agent Jorge Mendes—control the most important 
players creates a situation ripe for match-fixing.181 These players are 
at clubs competing against each other in the best domestic and 
international competitions, with millions of dollars on the line. 
Indeed, there have long been concerns and complaints regarding the 
role of agents and their influence.182 However, rather than improve 
the regulation of player agents, FIFA has recently deregulated the 
practice; what control it could have had over who represents players, 
and what potential there was for monitoring and protecting against 
conflicts of interest, is gone.183 La Liga raises the question: if FIFA is 
so concerned with match-fixing and the integrity of competition, why 
does it not also look into improving the regulation of loan deals, and 
why has it deregulated the archaic regulatory framework for player 
agents?184 
Furthermore, it does not necessarily follow that because some TPO 
investors seek to abuse these agreements and exert undue influence 
over the club,185 that all investors in TPO agreements seek to do so. 
The huge financial gains investors routinely see from these 
agreements show how much investors gain even without undue 
influence.186 As will be touched on, one possible solution to 
preventing agreements in which investors seek to assert undue 
influence is to properly regulate and monitor TPO—a solution that 
 
181 David Conn, Jorge Mendes: The Most Powerful Man in Football?, THE GUARDIAN 
(Sept. 22, 2014, 8:01 EDT), http://www.theguardian.com/football/2014/sep/22/-sp-jorge     
-mendes-agent-third-party-ownership-players. 
182 See generally Paul Kelso, Soccer Agents: The Ugly Face of the Beautiful Game, 
THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 15, 2003, 21:25 EDT), http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2003/aug 
/16/football.paulkelso1. 
183 Nick De Marco, The End of the Licensed Football Agent?, LAWINSPORT (Nov. 20, 
2014), http://www.lawinsport.com/blog/item/the-end-of-the-licensed-football-agent. 
184 The Point of View of La Liga, supra note 92. 
185 Supra Part II.E.2. 
186 Supra Part II.D. 
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would preserve those innocent financial agreements between investor 
and club while ensuring against third-party influence.187 
In terms of FIFA’s objective to protect contractual stability, TPO 
does not necessarily destabilize the contracts between player and club. 
As Reck points out, TPO can improve the contractual stability of 
Selling Clubs; TPO agreements help Selling Clubs hold on to players 
they would otherwise be forced to sell.188 
First, because the investor’s economic rights in the player 
extinguish once the player is transferred, it is not possible for the 
investor to continuously move the player without negotiating new 
TPO agreements with each club.189 Investors, therefore, aim to 
transfer their player once, for the largest price, and to the biggest 
club.190 While it could be argued that just this single sale undermines 
contractual stability, players’ agents, and often players themselves, 
frequently angle for the same move facilitated by TPO arrangements. 
So it is uncertain whether contractual stability is any worse under 
TPO agreements. 
Second, not only is contractual stability not inherently worse with 
TPO than without it, Reck goes on to argue that TPO agreements 
actually increase contractual stability for Selling Clubs, helping them 
to hold on to important players they otherwise could not.191 
According to Reck, the greatest enemy of contractual stability for 
Selling Clubs is their financial insecurity, the very foe TPO is meant 
to combat.192 TPO agreements allow Selling Clubs to pay players 
wages more comparable to those offered by Top Clubs. These 
improved wages, combined with a general stabilizing of the Selling 
Club’s finances, help to disincentivize transfers away from Selling 
Clubs. From the players’ point of view, the draw of higher wages at 
other clubs is weaker, and from the clubs’ point of view, the financial 
necessity to sell is less. 
A highly visible example comes from Santos’ use of TPO to hold 
on to star player Neymar. As mentioned,193 in 2009, Santos, like 
many Brazilian clubs, was struggling financially and was faced with 
big money offers from Top Clubs in Europe proposing to buy 
 
187 Infra Part III.B.3.c. 
188 E-mail from Ariel Reck to author, supra note 177. 
189 Id. 
190 Id. 
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192 Id. 
193 See supra Part II.C.2. 
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Neymar.194 By entering an agreement with the fund DIS Esporte 
Group, Santos was able to offer Neymar an improved contract, 
keeping hold of a key on-field contributor until they transferred him 
to Barcelona in 2013 for an enormous fee.195 The Neymar situation 
illustrates how TPO can, in fact, increase the contractual stability 
between player and club, help clubs develop long-term plans, and 
help clubs maintain more control over when to transfer their players. 
Reck believes that without TPO investment, it will be impossible 
for cash-strapped Selling Clubs to refuse the advances of Top Clubs 
looking to buy their promising young talent.196 Thus, financial 
security will undermine any long-term development strategies the 
club might want to pursue in order to develop the squad necessary to 
compete with Top Clubs. In short, it is likely that the loss of TPO will 
result in more talented players leaving Selling Clubs for less money, 
further destabilizing Selling Clubs and entrenching the dominant 
clubs in international soccer. 
Next, Reck rebuts the idea TPO is financially harmful by 
comparing the practice to bank loans and other forms of outside 
funding.197 Reck’s argument is echoed by La Liga, which notes that 
banning TPO is inappropriate when similar means of third-party 
investment are used—and successfully regulated—in other 
industries.198 Reck himself cites the practice of third-party litigation 
funding, a practice valid all over Europe, which operates just like 
TPO agreements.199  There are some ethical questions surrounding 
third-party litigation, but, as with the TPO debate, without further 
research isolated instances of abuse should not lead to the 
condemnation of an entire practice. 
Additionally, Reck notes that many players in which third parties 
buy shares are not transferred.200 In these cases, only the club benefits 
from the initial investment from the TPO agreement: the player stays 
with the club, the TPO agreement runs its course and extinguishes, 
 
194 Duarte, supra note 14. 
195 David Bond, Neymar Case Embarrassed Barcelona, Says Club President, BBC: 
SPORT (Mar. 10, 2014, 18:37 GMT), http://www.bbc.com/sport/0/football/26520978. 
196 Reck, supra note 127. 
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and the club is free to keep the player or transfer him on, enjoying the 
full profit from the sale.201 
Finally, Reck and La Liga disagree with de Carvalho over the 
inevitability of financial harms and the vicious cycle of debt and 
dependency.202 Reck and La Liga do not ignore that TPO agreements 
can, and have, led to financial harm, but they both make it clear that, 
first, not all TPO agreements are financially harmful, and, second, 
with a proper regulatory framework in place, these dangers could be 
further mitigated.203 For Reck and La Liga, TPO agreements often 
lead to more stability and increased investment in clubs—investment 
that benefits the clubs themselves, the players employed and 
developed by the clubs, and the competitive balance of international 
soccer.204 
Without thorough investigation into the financial realities of TPO, 
it is impossible to effectively balance the costs and benefits of the 
practice—a level of investigation that has unfortunately been 
neglected by FIFA.205 At the very least, Reck and La Liga 
demonstrate that FIFA’s stated legitimate objectives may not justify 
banning TPO. 
b. Meca-Medina’s Second Prong: Are Restrictions Inherent? 
Assuming FIFA can prove its ban is justified by legitimate 
objectives, the second prong of Meca-Medina requires FIFA to show 
that restrictions are inherent, or necessary, in the pursuit of the 
justifying, legitimate objectives.206 In other words, there cannot be 
nonrestrictive means of achieving the same objectives.207 
Both sides of the TPO agree that some restriction on the practice is 
necessary, but disagree on the degree of restriction necessary.208 For 
example, Reck and La Liga advocate for increased regulation of 
TPO—regulation that would limit the scope of TPO agreements, 
prevent overdependence on the practice, and monitor and prevent 
 
201 Id. 
202 Reck, supra note 127; The Point of View of La Liga, supra note 92. 
203 Reck, supra note 127; The Point of View of La Liga, supra note 92. 
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206 Case C-519/04, Meca-Medina v. Comm’n, 2006 E.C.R. I-06991 para. 42; Staff 
Working Document, supra note 166, at annex 1, § 2.1.5. 
207 Meca-Medina, 2006 E.C.R. I-06991 para. 42; Staff Working Document, supra note 
166, at annex 1, § 2.1.5. 
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issues of third-party influence. And a key part of La Liga’s legal 
complaint against FIFA will be to prove restrictions present a viable, 
less-restrictive alternative.209 Therefore, the second prong—the 
necessity of some degree of restriction on TPO—is not the central 
issue. Instead, the challenge will hinge on the third prong: whether 
FIFA’s ban is disproportionately restrictive, that is, whether there is a 
viable, less-restrictive alternative. 
c. Meca-Medina’s Third Prong: Is FIFA’s Ban Proportionate? 
The crucial third prong of Meca-Medina requires that the 
restriction on competition be proportionate.210 A restriction is 
disproportionate if less-restrictive means can achieve the legitimate 
objectives used to justify the restriction under the first prong of Meca-
Medina.211 Thus, a key part of the legal challenge against FIFA by 
the Spanish and Portuguese leagues is to put forward viable, less-
restrictive alternatives that will achieve the same legitimate objectives 
FIFA uses to justify Article 18ter. 
As mentioned, there is the possibility that banning TPO will only 
make it more dangerous, more secretive, and create more uncertainty 
for Selling Clubs.212 La Liga argues that, as opposed to the dangers of 
banning TPO, regulating the practice would create legal certainty for 
clubs, protect clubs from aggressive third parties while preserving the 
undeniable financial utility of the practice, protect the integrity of 
competition, and maintain the financial utility of TPO.213 
In particular, La Liga puts forward the following regulations: 
capping the percentage of a player’s rights an investor can own; 
limiting the number of players on any one club an investor can own; 
prohibiting TPO agreements for minors; prohibiting certain 
contractual clauses that make it easier for investors to influence clubs; 
and prohibiting investment by certain interested parties.214 The goal 
of this regulatory framework is to limit the scope of TPO agreements, 
to prevent dangerous overdependence on TPO—an overdependence 
 
209 Reck, supra note 127; The Point of View of La Liga, supra note 92. 
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that could lead to the long-term financial harm de Carvalho warns 
against215—and to monitor and prevent undue third-party 
influence.216 Luís Villas-Boas Pires, a Portuguese sports law expert, 
has developed a more robust list of regulations to restrict the scope of 
TPO agreements and monitor these agreements to avoid undue third-
party influence. His list includes all of La Liga’s suggested 
regulations, as well as: establishing a TPO Licensor at the 
international and domestic levels, where clubs must disclose who 
owns the economic rights of their players; requiring TPO agreements 
be conditioned on the player’s consent; and limiting the number of 
clubs competing in the same league in which a single investor can 
own players.217 
In theory, these regulations would maintain the financial utility of 
TPO while also securing the same, legitimate objectives behind 
FIFA’s ban—preventing both overreliance on the practice and third-
party influence. Of course, without having been properly tested and 
evaluated, it is impossible to say conclusively whether or not 
regulations would succeed. That said, the potential success of 
regulations at least deserves greater consideration than that given to 
them by FIFA’s Working Group and Executive Committee, which 
seemingly dismissed them off-handedly.218 
Unfortunately, there is a potentially fatal self-defeating paradox in 
regulating TPO. As Ranson of R2 Assets maintains, some third 
parties only enter a TPO agreement if it lets them influence club 
policy.219 If regulations succeed in preventing third-party influence, 
many third parties may no longer feel comfortable investing, and TPO 
investment could dry up entirely. In other words, regulations would 
be self-defeating. 
Regulations must achieve twin objectives. First, regulations must 
limit investment to a healthy level in order to strike a balance between 
reckless overreliance on TPO and elimination of the practice 
altogether. Second, regulations must prevent third-party influence. 
Banning TPO would succeed in both preventing dangerous 
overreliance on the practice and third-party influence; thus, if 
regulations fail to achieve either of these goals, they are not a viable 
alternative to FIFA’s ban. The problem is, by successfully preventing 
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third-party influence, regulations will likely dry up TPO investment 
completely. Thus, the theoretical benefit of regulating TPO rather 
than banning it may be impossible to achieve. 
It is, however, possible there are third parties willing to invest 
without influence over club policy and that these third parties would 
continue to enter TPO agreements if regulations came into play, 
resolving the above paradox. Indeed, we have already seen the 
tremendous profits TPO creates for third-party investors, and the 
potential for this profit remains so long as Selling Clubs remain in 
such dire need of financing.220 Therefore, it is not impossible to 
believe that there are third-party investors who would continue to 
invest once these regulations were put in place to prevent undue third-
party influence. 
That said, Richard Scudamore, CEO of the English Premier 
League, has his doubts: “It is impossible for me to believe that the 
person who has the financial interest in that player doesn’t have an 
influence over the future of that player.”221 This will be a crucial part 
of the legal challenge against FIFA’s ban: can regulations mitigate the 
potential dangers of third-party influence without eliminating TPO 
investment altogether? If regulations cannot achieve these twin 
objectives, they fail to represent a viable alternative to FIFA’s ban. 
C. Replacing the Financial Utility of TPO 
The final question is that if FIFA’s ban does stand up to the legal 
challenge, is it possible to mitigate the harm Selling Clubs will suffer 
without such a crucial asset? TPO investment has long been a key tool 
for Selling Clubs to level the disparate playing field of international 
soccer, without which the gap between haves and have-nots will only 
continue to grow at an increased rate. In fact, with the recent 
announcement of the lucrative new Premier League domestic 
broadcasting deal as a sign of the money continuing to come into 
soccer, the income disparity between Top Clubs and Selling Clubs is 
already set to increase.222 The new deal is roughly a 70% increase on 
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the current deal, which had been, by far, the highest of all time.223 For 
perspective, the new deal means the lowest finisher in the Premier 
League will make more from its domestic broadcasting deal than the 
top finisher in the German Bundesliga, itself considered a top four 
league.224 With the financial disparity showing no signs of shrinking, 
it becomes even more important to find ways to mitigate the harm of 
losing TPO financing and to improve the distribution of wealth across 
leagues and clubs. The remainder of Part III.C suggests policies and 
mechanisms to help replace the financial utility of TPO and create a 
more equitable, financially stable—and therefore more competitive—
international soccer community. 
1. Improved Solidarity Mechanism and Training Compensation 
Training Compensation and the Solidarity Mechanism—
established by FIFA RSTP Articles 20 and 21 and Annexes 4 and 5—
are the two primary structural means of creating trickle-down from 
the top of the soccer pyramid to the bottom: from Top Clubs to 
Selling Clubs.225 The Solidarity Mechanism dictates that when a 
player is transferred before the end of his contract, 5% of the fee paid 
for the player is to be distributed amongst the clubs responsible for 
the player’s training between the ages of twelve and twenty-three.226 
Training Compensation is due to clubs responsible for training a 
player, up until his twenty-third birthday, the first time the player 
signs a professional contract or when he is transferred between clubs 
in different FAs, for example, from a Spanish club, registered with the 
Spanish FA, to an Italian club, registered with the Italian FA.227 
Unfortunately, a recent study from the European Club Association 
(ECA) highlights how infrequently payments from the Solidarity 
Mechanism are actually collected.228 The total solidarity payments 
collected for transfers between 2011 and 2013 was $57.9 million—
only 1.15%, rather than the 5% required by FIFA RSTP 21.229 That 
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means roughly $200 million in compensation was not paid.230 In 
addition, a FIFA report showed that only 1%, or $18 million, was 
paid in training compensation.231 The ECA report highlights 
significant issues in the monitoring and collecting of payments.232 
And Reck points out that Top Clubs have little incentive to pay these 
fees, when the current rules—and poor enforcement thereof—allow 
them to hold out on payments, either by avoiding them altogether or 
settling with the training club for significantly less than is due.233 
According to the ECA study, 80% of the compensation due from the 
Solidarity Mechanism is from Top Clubs, meaning better enforcement 
would lead to significant trickle-down revenue.234 
Reck believes the introduction of the FIFA Transfer Matching 
System,235 a system to track all transfers between domestic FAs, 
would improve enforcement of the Solidarity Mechanism.236 More 
robust monitoring and real consequences for failing to comply with 
Training Compensation and the Solidarity Mechanism would increase 
the trickle-down revenue to Selling Clubs who successfully develop 
young players and transfer them on to bigger clubs. All told, better 
implementation of the Training Compensation and Solidarity 
Mechanism would be a simple way to create significant trickle-down 
revenue and further incentivize investment in academies and other 
sustainable, long-term businesses practices. 
2. Reduced Role of Agents 
Another finding by the ECA report is that 14.6%, or $254 million, 
of the transfer fees paid between 2011 and 2013 went to agent 
commissions.237 And the amount is only rising.238 In the Premier 
League alone, clubs paid out $179 million in agent fees for transfers 
in 2014, almost $30 million more than in 2013.239 This is a 
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tremendous amount of money leaking out of soccer clubs and 
represents significant revenue that Selling Clubs do not receive. 
The role of the agent in international soccer ought to be 
reevaluated, and, at the least, the amount of compensation possible 
should be capped. Unfortunately, FIFA has done just the opposite by 
recently deregulating the practice—the full consequences of which 
are still uncertain.240 
3. Luxury Tax 
An idea initially voiced by Dupont, instating a luxury tax, would be 
another way to cause trickle-down, as well as potentially limit the 
spending of Top Clubs, helping Selling Clubs to catch up.241 FIFA 
could set a soft cap of what clubs could spend on transfer fees over 
the course of a season, or multiple seasons, and any amount spent 
over that threshold would be taxed at an incredibly high rate. The 
taxes could be allocated to domestic FAs, which could in turn 
distribute the taxes to clubs that are struggling financially but that can 
demonstrate they are making real efforts to modernize, increase 
performance, and, in general, achieve long-term financial stability. 
Like improving the Solidarity Mechanism and Training 
Compensation, a luxury tax would create both trickle-down revenue 
and additional incentives for Selling Clubs to adopt better business 
practices. Of course, a luxury tax would likely be subject to 
complaints from Top Clubs against any limitations on their power to 
spend, complaints similar to those already raised against UEFA’s 
Financial Fair Play rules.242 
4. Distribution of Tournament Profits 
In the wake of the 2014 FIFA World Cup held in Brazil, FIFA has 
announced it would create a $100 million “Legacy Fund” for the 
country in thanks for a well-run World Cup and its contributions to 
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soccer in the past.243 For all World Cups, the financial burden rests on 
the host country to create the required infrastructure—stadiums and 
transportation, even housing and utilities, depending on the state of 
the country—meaning that these events generate lucrative profits for 
FIFA.244 The 2014 World Cup generated over $4 billion in sales for 
FIFA, and the 2018 edition is expected to generate over $5 billion.245 
Currently, the profit from these tournaments does little but pay FIFA 
executives or accumulate in FIFA’s enormous reserves.246 FIFA 
justifies keeping such large reserves so it can react to unexpected 
events.247 However, Brazil’s “Legacy Fund” invites the idea that 
profits from World Cups, which would otherwise go to FIFA’s 
reserves could at least in part go to helping lessen the financial 
disparity. This money could be distributed similarly to the funds 
created through the proposed luxury tax; the tax could be distributed 
to domestic FAs, who would then reward Selling Clubs who show 
intent and effort to modernize. 
These mechanisms would further incentivize efforts to modernize, 
improve market performance, achieve long-term financial stability, 
and improve trickle-down revenue to help mitigate the initial harm 
Selling Clubs will suffer without TPO investment. Ideally the loss of 
TPO will spur innovation in Selling Clubs, to incentivize them to 
develop and adopt modern business practices, and better orient 
themselves towards long-term, sustainable success.248 However, 
maintaining this laissez-faire attitude that currently permeates 
international soccer, leaving Selling Clubs on their own to save 
themselves is reckless, arguably even negligent, and could have 
 
243 Tariq Panja, FIFA’s $100 Million to Boost Brazil as World Cup Gift, BLOOMBERG 
(Nov. 10, 2014, 8:00 PM PST), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-11-10/fifa-s-100-
million-to-boost-brazil-soccer-as-world-cup.html. 
244 Id. 
245 Id. 
246 FIFA, FINANCIAL REPORT 2013 14 (2014), http://www.fifa.com/mm/document 
/affederation/administration/02/30/12/07/fifafr2013en_neutral.pdf; Doreen Carvajal, For 
FIFA Executives, Luxury and Favors, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2011), http://www.nytimes 
.com/2011/07/18/sports/soccer/18iht-fifa18.html?pagewanted=all. 
247 FIFA, supra note 246, at 20. 
248 See Duarte, supra note 14 (“Clubs will obviously take a financial hit in the short 
term[,] but Fifa’s ban on third-party ownership should [] be seen as an opportunity. Clubs 
will have to focus more seriously on youth development and . . . [t]he ruling will force 
Brazilian clubs to actually become more professional and moderni[z]e . . . . Whoever has 
their feet on the ground will have financial and sporting success.” (quoting Brazilian 
football business expert Amir Somoggi)). 
HALL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/31/2015  8:57 AM 
220 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94, 179 
disastrous consequences beyond just Selling Clubs, with the entire 
soccer ecosystem at risk. 
CONCLUSION 
Working under the assumption that FIFA defeats the legal 
challenge against Article 18ter, losing TPO could dramatically change 
the financial and competitive landscape of international soccer. 
Selling Clubs who have long used TPO to compete with Top Clubs, 
or relied on the financing to stave off bankruptcy altogether, will, all 
of a sudden, be forced to find new sources of funding. The current 
economic landscape is harshly skewed in favor of the Top Clubs, and 
the loss of TPO will only worsen this. Ideally, in response to the 
sudden loss of TPO investment, Selling Clubs will innovate to  
develop, adopt modern business practices, and better orient 
themselves towards long-term, sustainable success. However, this is a 
long-term solution to Selling Clubs’ difficulties, and the harm of 
losing TPO will be much more immediate. To mitigate this harm and 
ensure competitiveness in the immediate future, wholesale, systemic 
changes to the international soccer community will be required. 
Regulations to help control the scope of TPO agreements, to limit 
clubs’ dependence on TPO investment, and to monitor investor 
influence could present a viable alternative to banning TPO outright. 
The fact this possibility was seemingly so hastily dismissed, however, 
leads to the concern that FIFA’s quick decision to ban rather than 
regulate TPO was political in nature, not the result of a thoroughly 
researched and balanced evaluation. In support of this sad conclusion, 
two independent studies came back in favor of TPO. First, the 
Working Group only met once before deciding to ban TPO. And 
second, FIFA’s General Assembly itself thought more investigation 
was necessary. 
There is concern that regulations are potentially self-defeating: if 
they successfully prevent third-party influence, they could effectively 
dry up TPO investment altogether and end up offering no better 
solution than FIFA’s ban. Still, with the incredible profit to be made 
by third parties—a profit possible even without harming the club 
involved—there is a strong possibility that this catch-22 would not 
come to pass and that regulations would succeed in ensuring against 
overreliance and undue third-party influence while maintaining TPO 
as the necessary financial tool it has become. 
Opponents of TPO will point to high-profile, isolated cases of 
abuse of the TPO system as evidence TPO should be banned. The 
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Tevez and Mascherano deals that first brought UK attention to TPO 
or the recent Rojo affair are sure to garner attention. However, what 
will get less attention are TPO agreements that naturally and 
harmlessly run their course, with the clubs getting the funds they so 
desperately require and the investor earning a legitimate payout on his 
gamble. Exceptions should not be mistaken as the rule. And, at the 
very least, the real, long-term financial and competitive pros and cons 
of TPO and the viability of regulations need to be given due 
examination. Otherwise, FIFA’s ban brings the future of the 
international soccer community into question. If Article 18ter stands 
without systemic changes, Top Clubs’ positions at the peak of the 
pyramid will be entrenched while Selling Clubs at the bottom will 
disappear. The legal challenge against FIFA is strong. Without drastic 
changes towards a more equitable and stable community, the future of 
international soccer could hinge on the outcome. 
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